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The threat landscape for industrial control systems is ever-expanding and these systems have proven to be
attractive targets for cyber attackers. Programmable Logic Controllers are major components in ICSs and
hence need to be well-protected and monitored. By examining the existing research in this field we found
that there is a void in comprehensive analysis of data logging and extraction features on industrial devices.
However, analysis of these features and evaluation of their applicability for cyber intrusion detection would
significantly facilitate their adoption by intrusion detection tools. In order to close the gap, we analyzed the
logging and extraction capabilities of the Siemens S7-1200 PLC and HMI panel. We implemented a PLC logic
for data logging called PLCBlockMon. In this paper, we provide guidelines for its usage and demonstrate its
applicability for cyber intrusion detection in selected scenarios.
Keywords: Industrial Control Systems, Cyber Security, Logging and Extraction, PLC, Intrusion Detection
1. INTRODUCTION
Industries are increasingly relying on machines
and automated processes. For these machines to
operate reliably, Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
have been designed to operate with high availability,
reliability and safety, which leaves the security of
these systems typically lacking. The ICS industry
has in the past relied on isolation (“air gaps”)
to make their ICS network secure. However, in
the last decade, infrastructures of ICS networks
have started to become tightly integrated with
standard IT networks. This has the advantage of
allowing for remote access and control of devices
by engineers leveraging the TCP/IP protocol suite
and Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware.
Besides these benefits, this has also opened the
doors for malicious users to deploy remote attack
vectors on insecure ICSs.
There are multiple examples of cyber-attacks on
ICSs, the most famous of them is the Stuxnet. This
malware was designed to destroy gas centrifuges
in Iran’s uranium enrichment plant, by over-
pressurizing them and over-speeding their rotors
(Lagner (2011)). This was achieved by modifying
the control logic on certain PLC controllers in
the plant. Other examples of ICS attacks with
physical consequences are two cyber-attacks on
Ukranian electricity distribution networks. One of
them occurred in December 2015, which caused a
large power blackout (E-ISAC report (2011)), while
the other one, named Crashoverride (Dragos Report
(2017)), occurred almost exactly one year later, and
lead to an hour long power outage.
In order to detect cyber-attacks in ICS networks
many security companies now offer network traffic
monitoring solutions (e.g., Silent Defence (2018),
Dragos Platform (2018), SCADAguardian (2018),
Darktrace Industrial (2018)). Also, many researchers
are proposing different analysis methods on in-
dustrial protocols (Ponomarev (2016)) providing
new ways for attack detection. However, monitor-
ing of end-devices, Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs), which are responsible for the control of
industrial processes, for security purposes is largely
an unexplored area. In fact, these devices are mainly
monitored by control engineers during regular check-
ups, in order to query the status of the PLC (e.g.,
cycle time, operational mode, etc.) (Copy (2015)).
This is typically done using vendor-specific tools for
PLC diagnostics.
In this paper, we explore different data logging and
extraction methods on industrial devices that are
available in our ICS testbed and explore their usage
for cyber-intrusion detection purposes. Therefore, in
c© Findrik et al. Published by
BCS Learning and Development Ltd.
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the first section, we introduce the experimental ICS
environment used in the experiments. In Section 3,
an analysis of different data logging and extraction
capabilities is given. The main contribution of this
paper is a logic for data logging on a PLC, which is
presented in Section 4, along with an analysis of its
application scenarios for cyber-intrusion detection in
Section 5.
2. EXPERIMENTAL ICS ENVIRONMENT
ICSs are large and complex environments that are
commonly used in industries, such as manufac-
turing, electric power generation, chemical plants,
oil refineries, and wastewater treatment facilities
for process control. Implementing a full-scale ICS
environment for solely research purposes can be
an overwhelming and expensive task, hence for
conducting scientific experiments it is common to
construct ICS testbeds using only a few represen-
tative pieces of equipment that is necessary an-
swer research questions (Survey (2014)). In order
to analyze data logging and extraction features on
industrial devices, we have constructed a small-
scale testbed that is comprised of Siemens soft-
ware and hardware components that are used in
real ICS facilities. Siemens is one of the biggest
ICS vendors alongside Honeywell, Rockwell/Allen-
Bradley, and Schneider Electric, thus its equipment
has been chosen for the testbed. Siemens devices
included in the testbed are an S7-1200 controller,
HMI panel KTP-700, and a Windows 7 desktop
machine with TIA portal v14 software application,
which is used as an engineering workstation for
PLC/HMI programming and configuration. While the
experiments conducted in this work are limited to the
S7-1200, this device offers insights into the larger
S7 product suite, as they all share similar features.
The architecture of our testbed is designed to mirror
local monitoring and control of a physical process,
therefore representing cell zones of a general ICS
Figure 1: The Purdue Reference Architecture for ICS.
architecture corresponding to Levels 0 to 2 in the
Purdue model (Obregon (2014)), as shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of our testbed.
In the future, we plan to extend the testbed to
include Level 3 systems that are responsible for plant
operations, such as a data historian and desktop-
based HMI, which are responsible for plant-wide
data logging across all cell zones, and can also be
utilized for cyber-intrusion detection.
Figure 2: Architecture of the experimental ICS testbed.
All the aforementioned devices are connected to a
network switch. In addition, a laptop running Kali
Linux (Kali (2018)) in a virtual machine is used for the
generation of experimental attack scenarios, which
are described in later sections. The S7-1200 PLC
used as a process simulator and the water level
controller of a coolant tank. The water tank has three
valves (fill, drain and coolant valve) with a fixed flow
rate. The current water level is simulated on the PLC
as an analog input, and its value is calculated based
on the current status of the valves (ON or OFF) and
knowledge of their flow rates. Figure 3 shows the
visualization of the process on the HMI display.
The tank water is used as a coolant for another
process, hence it is assumed that the coolant valve
is turned ON or OFF at random times, in order to
simulate the demand for coolant. To balance out
the lack of water in the tank, the fill valve is turned
on after the water level drops under a certain level
(the orange indicator on the tank) and turns off after
a certain water level is reached (the red indicator
on the tank). The drain valve is not automatically
controlled and it serves for occasional maintenance
related tank emptying. Control actions can also be
manually overridden by the operator using the HMI
screen buttons.
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Figure 3: HMI visualization of the tank water level process.
3. DATA LOGGING AND EXTRACTION
CAPABILITIES
This section will introduce the monitoring functions
that are available on the testbed devices i.e., the S7-
1200 controller and the HMI panel. Furthermore, the
specific capabilities of the logging functions will be
elaborated alongside their security features against
manipulation and their capabilities for extraction of
logged data.
3.1. PLC Data Logging and Extraction
3.1.1. PLC Logging Data Blocks
The PLC logging data blocks allow for logs of logic
tags and data to be stored in the local memory. The
data logging blocks included in the TIA portal provide
the basic functions needed to build a logging system.
This includes blocks to create, open, clear, delete
and write to the log files. This leaves implementation
of the logging to be decided by the programmer. The
three main functions that need to be programmed
to create a fully working logging system are data
transfer to DataBlock (DB), handling of the file state,
and triggering when to sample the data. The basic
functionality of the blocks creates a single circular
log. New log files can be created with the NewFile
block to prevent overwriting data; however, this would
be limited by the small internal memory size. Another
consideration with the memory size is with the log
sampling rate. Using a cyclic pulse to trigger this
would create a lot of duplicate data and hence
would overwrite data much faster. Only recording
tag values when a change occurs is a much more
efficient implementation. This block can accept most
data types, and therefore can record most of the
tags, DB values and memory locations natively.
One known exception to the data types accepted is
Boolean, but this can be overcome by storing the
value in a different type. The logs are formatted using
CSV log format, which makes parsing information
from the logs very easy. As the creation of this
log requires programming the functionality into the
ladder logic, this logging method requires the most
effort to implement out of all the features looked
at. This change of logic would result in the need
for system validation. For this reason, the use of
this logging feature would be most applicable for
facilities being designed from the ground up or that
are in the process of replacing equipment. As these
logs are programmed in the logic of the PLC, they
are only as secure as the load memory of the
PLC. Fortunately, more recently produced Siemens
SIMATIC S7 controllers (e.g. the S7-300 and S7-400
PLC series delivered since April of 1998, Siemens
Security Bulletin (2011)) offer integrated protection
mechanisms for restricting access to memory areas.
Memory access can be set to three different levels
(write, write/read and complete protection) and it
is password protected (S7 security (2000)). Hence,
the memory of the logs programmed in the logic
of the PLC should be adequately protected against
potential malicious alterations by setting at least
protection level against writing.
3.1.2. Diagnostic Buffer Logs
The Diagnostic Buffer is a log of PLC system level
events and is stored locally in each CPU. Originally,
the diagnostic buffer is designed to provide users
with logs for rapid detection of errors and evaluation
of events that caused PLC stoppage (i.e., PLC
entering in STOP mode) (S7-1200 (2014)). The
log has a size of 50 events, in the case of S7-
1200, of a circular log format. A configuration
setting can be enabled which allows for some
system events of the same type to be collated
together, increasing the time until old events get
overwritten (S7-1200 (2014)). The features which
are recorded in the Diagnostic Buffer are: (i) error
events (e.g., CPU, IO, module, submodule errors,
network connectivity problems), (ii) CPU mode
changes (e.g., CPU RUN/STOP changes), and (iii)
user-defined messages (e.g., water tank level too
high notifications).
The Diagnostic Buffer can be accessed in several
ways using existing Siemens features. These are
the integrated web server, TIA portal and via the
HMI panel, if configured to do so. To use the
web server to view this information, the user rights
need to be expanded from the minimum to include
query diagnostics. This gives the user access to the
Diagnostic Buffer, but also the resource consumption
of the device, connection resource statistics and
information about the module. The diagnostic
information can also be requested in the ladder logic
using the GET Diag block (S7 diagostics (2014)).
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This would then allow the programmer to use any of
the existing communication blocks (e.g., SMTP over
TLS) to transmit the diagnostic information. The TIA
portal is intended as a programming and diagnostic
tool and there can only be one connection active
at any time to a given PLC. For this reason, this
method is less practical than the other options, as it
creates more challenges for the engineers working
with the devices. Use of the desktop HMI to save
the logs, appears to be the most practical method.
The Diagnostic Buffer can be cleared by resetting the
PLC to factory settings if no memory card is installed;
however this is not possible without a password if
the minimum access protection level is set on the
controller.
3.1.3. Extraction of Log Information
The main method for extracting the PLC logs
remotely is with the built-in web server. To do this,
the user requires the minimum rights plus read
files access. This allows the user to download
the data logs and receive data from the device,
but not to delete data. The web server has an
automatic refresh setting and the minimum rate is
every 5 seconds. This means that the size of the
data logs should be large enough to last for the
minimum refresh rate that is set in the web server.
Other options for sending the data to a remote
system include using the T(U)SEND C function
blocks which supports ISO-on-TCP, TCP or UDP
(S7 User Communication (2000)). For example, the
UDP function block has been used to implement log
extraction in SYSLOG format (S7 Syslog (2018)).
While these protocols are not secured, they might
be used in conjunction with a network intrusion
detection system identifying potential manipulations
of logs in transmission. Another way to securely
extract logs is by sending them over secure email
connections (SMTP over TLS), which is available
in the function block TMAIL C (Siemens SMTP,
(2004)). This option is a good alternative for cases
when the web server is not enabled. Lastly, if the
logs are stored on a memory card used by the PLC,
they could also be manually extracted. This is highly
impractical for real facilities and might only be useful
for forensic purposes in a case where the PLC has
crashed.
3.2. HMI Data Logging and Extraction
The HMI panel has the capability to locally store
logs on a connected Siemens USB device or SD
card. This feature is called Historical Data, and offers
several different options for configuring the behaviour
of the logs. The logs stored on the HMI consist of
recorded values of HMI tags and the PLC tags which
are read by the HMI. These logs have three options
for when the tag values are recorded and this can
be set individually for each tag being recorded. The
logging options are: on change of the tag value,
cyclically with a set period, or can be triggered by
the change in a different tag. The HMI does not
rely on running logic to read the PLC memory and
hence can continue to log memory values while the
PLC is in stop mode. A limitation of this feature is
the HMI will not be able to log a pulse in a value
on the PLC that lasts less than the update cycle
of the HMI tags. This would need to be considered
for the configuration of the HMI, as any sensitive
control signal that can cause a change would need
the update cycle period to be set to the minimum.
For accessing the logs on the SIMATIC Basic HMI
panels, there is only one option, which is using a
removable USB key. However, this is not practical for
a large facility or for use in an automated system.
The advanced HMI panels (i.e., the SIMATIC HMI
Comfort panel series) do have the option to enable
a web server for remote data extraction (Siemens
HMI Web Access (2000)). The desktop version of
the HMI (Siemens WinCC (2000)), typically used for
implementation of Level 3 operators screens, has
capabilities for logging PLC/HMI tags and alarms
on disk memory, thus offers much greater options
for saving and transmitting the logs to a detection
system. Besides PLC alarms, the Basic HMI panel
also has the ability to display analog (triggered by
exceeding/falling below a previously defined limit
value) and bit alarms that are defined by users on
the HMI screen, and store their history in a cyclic
buffer. The integrity of the logs on the HMI panel
and similarly the desktop version is reliant on the
configuration of the HMI being secure. A summary
of the these features can be seen in Table 1.
4. PLCBLOCKMON: DATA LOGGING ON PLCS
In this section, we describe implementation of
our data logging block, called PLCBlockMon.
PLCBlockMon1 is designed to log different PLC tags.
The idea is to log only tags which are capturing the
most important states of the process being controlled
and respective PLC input/output values influencing
the process states. Therefore, exactly which tags
should be logged is dependent on the process being
controlled, requiring it to be tailored to individual PLC
logic. Furthermore, in this section, we will illustrate
the process of configuring PLCBlockMon for logging
the states of the water tank process.
The control ladder logic programmed in the PLC
uses 3 digital inputs, 3 digital outputs, 1 simulated
analog input and 3 HMI (digital) inputs. The three
HMI inputs are the buttons which can be seen in
Figure 3. The three digital inputs to the PLC indicate
1The source is publicly available at https://github.com/
CSR-AIT/PLCBlockMon
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PLC Block Logs HMI Panel logs PLC Diagnostic Logs
Storage Location Load memory of PLC Siemens memory connected
to the HMI
Load memory of PLC
Secure extraction
methods
Memory card, Web Server or
SMTP over TLS
USB Stick TIA Portal, HMI or Web
Server
Other extraction
methods
TCP or UDP communication
logic blocks
- TCP or UDP communication
logic blocks
Logging Scope Logic and Memory Locations
on PLC
HMI/PLC tags and alarms Diagnostic events
Trigger method Cyclic or on programmed
trigger
Cyclic, On Demand or On
Change
Event Triggered
Table 1: A summary of logging features that are readily available on industrial testbed devices.
positions of the valves, whereas digital outputs are
used for setting their position. Lastly, the analog input
to the PLC is a simulated value of the tank level.
These are the ten most important tags selected to
log, since they influence the PLC state thus the
process.
After logging tags have been chosen, the control
logic needs to be augmented with additional
instructions for capturing tag changes in memory
locations that are accessible by PLCBlockMon. In
Figure 4, this is illustrated on a portion of the control
logic responsible for switching the fill valve ON. The
fill valve can be switched ON by an operator via the
HMI (HMI Fill EN) input tag or automatically by the
SR bistable logic, if water level is under a certain
threshold.
Figure 4: PLC control logic augmented with tag saving
instructions.
Changes in the HMI input (i.e. HMI Fill EN tag)
and the digital output for the fill valve control are
saved on memory location for outputs (M44.0) and
inputs (M45.0) - by instructions highlighted in yellow
rectangles. After the changes have been captured,
logs need to be saved on the load memory of the
PLC. This is achieved by two main internal blocks
of the PLCBlockMon - Trigger and Data Log, shown
in Figure 5. PLCBlockMon needs to be placed at
the end of the main control logic (i.e., organization
block). By placing PLCBlockMon at the end it is
ensures that the control logic will no longer change
input/output tags in a given execution cycle.
Figure 5: Main functional blocks of PLCBlockMon.
The trigger block first compares input and output
bytes with their previous state saved internally. If
there are any changes detected, the trigger for
the subsequent data logging block is activated and
saves the current changes in the CSV file residing
in memory. For the sake of compression, digital
inputs and outputs are logged into a byte array and
represented in the file as integer values. Figure 6
provides an example of such a log file.
Figure 6: Log file generated by PLCBlockMon.
5. CYBER INTRUSION DETECTION
Our intrusion detection technique is based on the
comparison of log files generated by PLCBlockMon
on the PLC and log files collected on the HMI panel.
This section first explains the logging method used
on the HMI panel during the experiments, after which
the experimental validation results are presented
and explained.
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5.1. HMI-based data logging implementation
Logging on the HMI panel was made available by
a connected Siemens USB device. This allowed
different tags to be logged using the HMI Historical
Data build-in function. The tags to be logged and
the type of acquisition mode to be selected were
configured via the TIA portal. This can be seen in
Figure 7.
Figure 7: Development Phase process steps for develop-
ing secure IoT applications.
The tags logged on the HMI are: (i) Button tags
linked to a tag on the PLC and hence if the tag is
changed on one device the tag on the other device is
also changed, either by the HMI sending a request to
change the tag on the PLC or if the tag was changed
on the PLC then the HMI will change its value when it
reads the PLC tags - also logged by PLCBlockMon;
(ii) Press tags internal to the HMI indicating when
the switch is manually changed by an operator; (iii)
Out tags directly linked to the digital control output
tags on the PLC also logged by PLCBlockMon; (iv)
TankLevel tag linked to the PLC tank level variable. It
is necessary to log the same tags via PLCBlockMon
and on the HMI in order to be able to compare their
values.
Figure 8: Log file generated by the HMI.
For tag values which are recorded cyclically, if the
network connection is interrupted, then the HMI will
automatically log the last known value but set the
validity flag to 0 to indicate that this is not a up-to-
date value (as shown in Figure 8).
5.2. Experimental Validation
This section will discuss the results of the
experiments carried out. Validation of the resource
usage and network resilience of the logging features
will be examined first, and then three attack
scenarios will be used to illustrate applications of the
logging features on the example of the water tank
process.
5.2.1. DoS Attack Detection
To examine the accuracy of the logs under strenuous
network conditions, the logs were recorded under
a DOS attack that is generated using hping3 tool
(Hping (2014)) from the malicious user laptop shown
in Figure 2. The HMI historical data logs rely on the
information transmitted to it by the PLC and hence
are susceptible to losing data when the network
connection is interrupted. As can be seen in Figure
9, where the data was set to record when the value
changes, the HMI does not change the value in the
logs or record a default value when the network
connection is lost. The DOS attack was started at
100 seconds and finished at 200. This is the reason
for the delay in the HMI FillOut being set to zero, as it
was waiting for the connection. For tag values which
Figure 9: PLC and HMI tag values during DoS experiment.
are recorded cyclically if the network connection is
interrupted, then the HMI-based log will record the
last known value but set the validity flag (shown in
Figure 8) to 0 to indicate that this is not a valid
value. In addition to log information provided by
PLCBlockMon and the HMI, this attack could be
correlated with information from a network intrusion
detection system, if one is deployed on the same
industrial control network.
5.2.2. Protocol Attacks on the PLC
This scenario is based on a vulnerability being
identified by an attacker or similarly, where a known
protocol vulnerability can be used, due to older
firmware on operational devices. Security issues
with the protocol can allow an attacker to replay,
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manipulate packets, or even change memory areas,
and by doing so change the operation of the PLC. For
example, exploitation of security vulnerabilities on
the S7 protocol have previously been demonstrated
in following papers (Bresford (2011), Cheng et al
(2017)). The stages of such attacks could occur
as follows: (i) to produce a specific modification
to a process the attacker would need to have
knowledge of what the PLC is doing and observe the
packets to build up a profile of the memory locations
being set over the network, (ii) having built up a
behavioral profile and gained knowledge of the PLC
configuration, and attacker could capture the specific
packet which is intended to replay, modify it to avoid
rejection and forward it to the PLC. Or in case the
memory area is not write protected, the attacker
could simply issue memory force commands. Where
the vulnerability in the protocol allows for packet
manipulation, an additional step in this scenario
could be to modify the return packets to the HMI
to hide the changes caused by the replay attack. In
this case, if done correctly, then both logs would look
normal compared to each other, however the PLC
logs would show process control inconsistencies
e.g., fill valve opened when it should be closed (i.e.,
when the water level is above a certain threshold).
However, if the attacker is forcing PLC tags which
are normally changed only via the HMI button, their
actions could be detected by the log comparison, as
shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Normal button changes (left) and changes
caused by forcing PLC memory (right).
In reference to the operating conditions replicated in
the testbed, the ability of an attacker to modify the
memory tag was simulated using the force function
in the TIA portal. A comparison of the HMI Historical
Data and the PLC logs can now be used to identify
if the memory change was initiated from the HMI
directly. The difference in timestamps can indicate
the direction of data flow, this can be seen in Figure
10, where the delay on the right-hand pulses are
larger than the pulses on the left-hand where no
delay is visible. This delay is the result of the HMI not
changing the log until the next request for data, which
is a cyclic process of a pre-set period, and hence has
a longer delay than immediate update for legitimate
changes from the HMI. The information shown in the
figure could be provided to a sequence-aware IDS
(Caselli et al (2015)), which can identify intrusions
based on the execution order of the events.
Besides looking at the sequence of the events,
a third way in which the logs could be used for
the detection of attacks manipulating HMI control
packets, is if the HMI is configured to log button
presses as well as lot changes in the tag controlled
by that button - as explained in Section 5.1. If this
is implemented and the tag on the PLC is changed
using the force function or with replay attack, then the
press will not be logged in the HMI Historical Data.
The difference between a normal and malicious
button change would be captured in HMI Historical
Data logs and detected by analyzing the execution
order of the events.
5.2.3. Malicious Logic Upload Detection
This scenario is designed to show the limitations
of PLCBlockMon and Historical Data logs, while
illustrating how the Diagnostic Buffer and the
resource statistics available from the PLC can be
used to look for unusual changes. The malicious
logic upload attack considers the following steps: (i)
an attacker sets up a phishing attack or installs a
key logger in the engineer’s laptop, (ii) the engineer
connects to PLC, entering password to carry out
maintenance or view diagnostic information with TIA
portal, (iii) the attacker captures the password and
then connects to PLC with a different the TIA portal
and downloads the existing logic, (iv) the attacker
can also view the real-time operation of the system
to build a profile, (v) once the attacker has the logic
of the PLC, they can modify it to carry out their
objective while simulating and displaying normal
operating conditions, (vi) the attacker uploads the
new logic. To achieve the steps described without
modifying the HMI configuration requires an attacker
to modify the mapping of the digital output pins on
the PLC. To do this, PLC must do a full restart
which clears the memory of the tags and databases.
The log files are not removed at this point, however
PLCBlockMon logic will fail to open the old file and
hence it will override with a new file with the same
name. Once the logic is compromised, the accuracy
of any programmed logs is unclear, as an attacker
can program the PLC logs to look as they want.
This can be seen in Figure 11, where the logs under
normal operating conditions can be seen on the
left of the graph where the changes in tank level
correspond to the change in the I/O tags.
The same behaviour linked to the normal PLC
operations can be seen on the right side of the upper
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Figure 11: Plot of PLCBlockMon log data before and after
logic is modified.
graph. However, in this case, the purple values are
not representing the true state of the PLC anymore
(the true state is represented with a black line in the
upper graph). The data on the right of the graph was
recorded after the logic was modified and represents
what was shown on the HMI and in the new fake
PLC logs. The gap of information in the centre of the
graph represents when the logic was being updated
and the PLC was in STOP mode. In this restart
process, where the PLC configuration is changed,
the log files are cleared of the old data and this is
the reason the gap is not interpolated by the plotting
tool. In an operational environment, an intentional
restart would require a system shutdown or some
other measure to prevent system instability while
the PLC is offline. For this reason, and the fact that
the logic of PLC in this environment is very unlikely
to change, makes a restart very suspicious. Thus
clearing of the log file would be an unusual event to
occur in a running system and might be an indication
of a malicious logic upload attack. Moreover, the
extra logic required to simulate the real process
behavior increases the memory usage of the PLC
- this change could also serve as an indication of
the attack. Additional indications could also be found
in the diagnostic buffers of the HMI and PLC. While
the PLC is in STOP mode, the HMI diagnostic buffer
would log network connection problems and the PLC
restart would be logged on the PLC diagnostic buffer.
A monitoring system with access to the diagnostic
buffers could use these indications as a trigger for
a logic validation system similar to that proposed by
(Govil et al (2017)).
5.2.4. Resource Usage Validation
For industrial control applications, the real-time
performance is of the utmost importance, hence the
logging logic should not have considerable impact on
the real-time performance of the PLC running control
logic. Tests of the PLCBlockMon logging function
block which was added to the normal tank control
logic showed that the cycle time was the same
compared against the PLC with no logging. However,
more load memory was used when PLCBlockMon
was running. For the log size of 100 entries, 6KB log
file was created on the PLC allowing 2 byte values
(maximum of 14 Boolean values) and one real value
to be stored (enough to store 9 boolean digital inputs
and tank level value).
6. CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the potential
for using the diagnostic and logging features
that are built into widely-deployed contemporary
industrial devices, specifically PLCs, for cyber
intrusion detection. We have found little related
research work (apart from Caselli et al (2015)) that
looks into the use of ICS-specific functions and
data logs for security purposes which motivated
us to conduct this study. In particular, we have
comprehensively analyzed the following options:
the HMI Historical Data, the PLC Data Logging
Blocks and the PLC Diagnostic Buffer, due to their
features for relevant ICS data logging along with
various possibilities for their extraction and usage for
intrusion detection. Moreover, we have implemented
a PLC logic allowing data logging on the Siemens
S7-1200 PLC, called PLCBlockMon, explained its
implementation and demonstrated the usage for
intrusion detection in conjunction with the HMI
Historical Data based on log comparison method. In
addition, we have shown how PLC data logs can be
successfully faked by uploading a well-constructed
malicious logic, but not without leaving traces
that might indicate such activity. It is also worth
mentioning that comparison of logs from different
devices requires time synchronization in the system,
since timestamps are generated on the individual
devices. Further investigation would be needed to
evaluate the resilience of the logging technique to
timing attacks such as NTP amplification attacks
(NTP Attacks (2016)). Another potential area for
further research would be to evaluate the application
of PLCBlockMon for ICS forensic purposes (Van
Vlie et al (2016)), its viability for deployment in
practical circumstances, expand current work to
other Siemens industrial devices and to consider
other ICS equipment manufactures. We hope the
findings from this research will serve as a base
for future cyber-security studies on ICS intrusion
detection, by providing collated information sources
on the logging and extraction features available on
wide suite of S7 devices.
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